

## Message Text

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9743

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 0402

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: WG VERIFICATION STUDIES

REF: A) USNATO 7054; B) BONN 1136; (C) STATE 1757; D) STATE 8359

1. AT FEBRUARY 4 MEETING, WG WILL TAKE UP STAFF GROUP DRAFT PAPER (TRANSMITTED BELOW) WHICH SUMMARIZES PAST STUDIES AND PRESENT POSITION ON VERIFICATION AND NEGOTIATED INSPECTION. COMMENT: STAFF GROUP PREPARED PAPER AT CANADIAN REQUEST (PARA 6, REF A). MISSION BELIEVES PAPER PROVIDES MARGINALLY USEFUL REVIEW OF WORK ON VERIFICATION. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENT BY FEBRUARY 4.

2. MISSION BELIEVES FRG REFERENCE (PARA 4, REF B) TO MORE U.S. SUPPORT AT BRUSSELS FOR FRG POSITIONS ON VERIFICATION REFERS TO OUR SUGGESTION OF BALANCED COVER NOTE FOR ANALYSIS OF FIXED POST MONITORING PROPOSAL (REF C) AND OUR RESERVATIONS  
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ABOUT TRYING TO SEND DETAILED WG REPORT ON GROUND INSPECTION SYSTEM TO SPC (REF D).

3. BEGIN TEXT OF STAFF GROUP DRAFT:

MBFR-VERIFICATION AND NEGOTIATED INSPECTION:  
SUMMARY OF PAST STUDIES AND PRESENT POSITION

BACKGROUND

1. VERIFICATION AND NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IS AN IMPORTANT BASIC FACTOR IN THE ALLIANCE POSITION ON MBFR. IT HAS BEEN AGREED(1) THAT: "THE PRINCIPLE AIM OF VERIFICATION SHOULD BE TO DETECT SIGNIFICANT BREACHES OF A (M)BFR AGREEMENT, WITH SUFFICIENT TIMELINESS AND IN SUCH A MANNER TO ENABLE OTHER PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT TO MAINTAIN THEIR OWN SECURITY, TO DENY THE VIOLATOR THE ADVANTAGE WHICH HE HAD HOPED TO GAIN AND TO BE ABLE TO CONFRONT THE GUILTY PARTY". THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S POLICY ON VERIFICATION IS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 15, 32 AND 33 OF "THE ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR"(2). THIS EMPHASISES TWO BASIC ELEMENTS:

(A) NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS OF ACQUIRING INTELLIGENCE IS A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF ANY AGREEMENT;

(B) IN ADDITION THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON OVERT VERIFICATION.

2. THE ADVANTAGES OF OVERT VERIFICATION ARE DESCRIBED IN A DRAFT SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE REPORT(3) TO THE COUNCIL. IN BRIEF THESE ADVANTAGES ARE:

(A) ENABLE ALL ALLIES TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY;

(B) PROVIDE MORE DIRECT MBFR MONITORING FOR THE ALLIES CONCERNED;

(C) MEET ALLIED DOMESTIC AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS REQUIREMENTS;

(D) MORE EFFECTIVE THAN NATIONAL MEANS FOR CHALLENGING A VIOLATOR;

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(E) FILLING OUT EXISTING INTELLIGENCE AND SHORTENING TIME TO MAKE VERIFICATION JUDGEMENTS;

(F) DETER VIOLATIONS BY INCREASING RISK OF DETECTION;

(G) INCREASE WARNING TIME;

(H) ENHANCE EAST/WEST CONFIDENCE.

THE ADVANTAGES IN (D), (E), (F) AND (G) ARE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT MILITARILY AND TECHNICALLY.

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(1) C-M(69)52(FINAL)

(2) C-M(73)83(FINAL)  
(3) ISD/61(4TH REVISE)  
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#### POLITICAL FACTORS

3. IT IS NOT WITHIN THE MANDATE OF THE WORKING GROUP TO CONSIDER POLITICAL FACTORS; THE GROUP HAS, HOWEVER, NOTED THAT FOR ONE NATION THERE CAN BE A DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE MILITARY/ TECHNICAL VIEW ON VERIFICATION AND NATIONAL POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES. THE WORKING GROUP, OTHER THAN NOTING THIS POINT, HAS CONCENTRATED ITS ENERGIES ON FINDING THE BEST MILITARY/TECHNICAL ANSWERS WHICH PROVIDE THE GREATEST ADVANTAGE TO NATO MILITARILY.

#### FINAL FORM OF AGREEMENT

4. BEFORE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS CAN BE MADE, ON THE DETAILED METHODS OF VERIFICATION TO BE NEGOTIATED, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE SOME INDICATION OF THE FINAL FORM OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. UNTIL THAT TIME THE WORKING GROUP CONTINUES ITS WORK ON PRODUCING MILITARY/TECHNICAL REPORTS ON THE POSSIBLE METHODS OF VERIFICATION AND THEIR APPLICATION. ALTHOUGH FINAL DETAILED RECOMMENDATION CANNOT BE MADE THE VARIOUS REPORTS REMAIN VALIED AS TO PRINCIPLE.

#### NATIONAL MEANS

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5. THE WORKING GROUP HAS NO DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAPABILITY OF NATIONAL MEANS OF GATHERING INTELLIGENCE. A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF INFORMATION IS INCLUDED IN THE "US APPROACH TO MBFR"(1). A MILITARY VIEW(2), BASED ON THE KNOWLEDGE AVAILABLE WITHIN NATO, STATES: "IN STRICT MILITARY TERMS A VERIFICATION SYSTEM WHICH RELIED WHOLLY ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS FOR VERIFICATION OF POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS AND ADHERENCE TO AN AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE WHOLLY EFFECTIVE. IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE CONFIDENCE AND ASSURANCE NECESSARY TO COMPENSATE, IN SOME MEASURE, FOR THE LOSS OF SOME ELEMENT OF STANDING NATO GROUND FORCES AND FOR THE CONSEQUENT REDUCTION OF READINESS AGAINST A POTENTIALLY UNDIMINISHED THREAT".

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6. SHAPE HAS STATED(3)-"WHILE NOT DENYING THE NECESSITY FOR VIGOROUS, CO-ORDINATED AND POSSIBLY INCREASED USE OF NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, SHAPE CONSIDERS OVERT INSPECTION A PRE-REQUISITE FOR UNDIMINISHED SECURITY".

OVERT MEANS

7. OVERT MEANS OF VERIFICATION COULD INCLUDE A GROUND SYSTEM CONSISTING OF EITHER MOBILE TEAMS OR STATIC POSTS OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH. AN ADJUNCT TO SUCH A SYSTEM COULD BE AERIAL INSPECTION. OVERT MEANS WOULD THEMSELVES BE A SUPPLEMENT TO NATIONAL MEANS.

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(1) US APPROACH TO MBFR, 30TH APRIL, 1973, ANNEX E

(2) IMSWM-70-74

(3) 100.1/20-5-4/S 64/73, 19TH JULY, 1973  
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(B) NEGOTIATED INSPECTION-GROUND SYSTEM (AC/276-D(74)4). THIS IS A VERY BRIEF INTERIM REPORT ON THE ACTUAL METHODS OF OVERT INSPECTION. IT STATES THAT MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF OVERT VERIFICATION. IT COMMENTS ON LIAISON, FREEDOM OF INSPECTION AND AERIAL INSPECTION. IT ALSO INDICATES THE NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS WHICH MIGHT BE REQUIRED, 25 IS THE MINIMUM SUGGESTED AND 100 THE MAXIMUM.

(C) NEGOTIATED INSPECTION-AERIAL INSPECTION (AC/276-D(74)13). THE WORKING GROUP AGREED THAT AERIAL INSPECTION WITH MINIMUM RESTRICTIONS WOULD BE A USEFUL ADJUNCT TO OTHER SYSTEMS OF INSPECTION AND WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO NATO. AIR PHOTOGRAPHY IS A METHOD OF AERIAL INSPECTION

WHICH WOULD GIVE MOST, IF NOT ALL, ALLIES A CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE. THE MORE ELEMENTS OF AN AERIAL INSPECTION SYSTEM THAT ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY BEING INSPECTED THE MORE OPPORTUNITY THERE WOULD BE TO FRUSTRATE THE SYSTEM. WEATHER CONDITIONS CAN IMPOSE LIMITATIONS ON AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY. MILITARILY AND TECHNICALLY ADVERSARY INSPECTION, WITH THE HOST PROVIDING OBSERVERS ONLY, WOULD BE THE MOST EFFICIENT SYSTEM. FINALLY IT NOTES THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY AND THE NEED FOR A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE TECHNICALITIES INVOLVED BEFORE A DETAILED AGREEMENT WERE MADE.

10. CURRENT STUDIES. THE WORKING GROUP STILL HAS TWO STUDIES IN HAND, BOTH OF WHICH COVER GROUND SYSTEMS.

(A) NEGOTIATED INSPECTION-GROUND SYSTEM

(AC/276-WP(74)5(4TH REVISE)). THIS IS A DETAILED BACKGROUND PAPER WHICH DRAWS TOGETHER THE THREADS OF THE EARLIER PAPERS. IT COVERS THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED OF AN INSPECTION SYSTEM; THE PHASES OF REDUCTION; THE BUILD-UP OF A VERIFICATION ORGANIZATION; A CALCULATION OF THE NUMBER OF TEAMS AND POSTS REQUIRED, AND THE NECESSARY MANPOWER; OBSERVERS; RECIPROCITY AND A SUMMARY OF THE BASIC FACTORS BEARING UPON THE CALCULATION OF THE SIZE AND TYPE OF OVERT VERIFICATION  
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ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD BEST SUIT NATO'S PURPOSES. IT'S DRAFT CONCLUSION STATES THAT: A SYSTEM OF LIAISON BETWEEN INSPECTORS AND HOST COUNTRIES WOULD BE ESSENTIAL; THE MOST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF OVERT INSPECTION WOULD CONSIST OF MOBILE TEAMS SUPPORTED BY SOME AERIAL INSPECTION AND STATIC POSTS AND THAT THE NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS REQUIRED WOULD FALL BETWEEN 25 AND 100, THERE WAS SUPPORT FOR AN ESTIMATE OF 65-70 TEAMS AS BEING REASONABLY REALISTIC.

(B) FIXED POST MONITORING (AC/276-WP(74)13 AND SITCEN 1901)  
THE WORKING GROUP STUDIED A US CONTRIBUTION AND NOTED A COMMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRG. THE PAPER STUDIES THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF FIXED POST MONITORING. THE WORKING GROUP AGREED WITH THE US ANALYSIS THAT A STATIC GROUND INSPECTION SYSTEM WOULD HAVE MILITARILY USEFULNESS ALBEIT LIMITED.

ACCEPTABILITY

11. ON 22ND MARCH, 1972 THE MBFR WORKING GROUP PRESENTED A REPORT (1) ON THE DEGREE FOR NATO OF TOLERABILITY AND DEPTH OF PENETRATION OF ADVERSARY OR NEUTRAL INSPECTION DESIGNED TO VERIFY

ADHERENCE TO FORCE LEVELS WHICH WOULD FORM ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES ON MBFR. THE REPORT IS A SYNTHESIS OF VIEWS CONTRIBUTED BY NATIONS AS THE RESULT OF A QUESTIONNAIRE. AMONGST OTHER ASSUMPTIONS WAS ONE THAT THE AIM WOULD BE TO VERIFY THE OBSERVANCE OF FORCE LEVELS IN TERMS OF MILITARY MANPOWER AND NUMBERS OF MAJOR EQUIPMENTS E.G. TANKS, ARTILLERY AND AIRCRAFT.

12. THE ACCEPTABILITY OF INSPECTION MEASURES WAS CONSIDERED UNDER THE FOLLOWING HEADINGS:

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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(A) INSTALLATIONS, ACTIVITIES AND AREAS TO BE PECLUDED FROM CLOSE INSPECTION.

(B) RESTRICTIONS ON AIRBORNE INSPECTORS, MEDIUM LEVEL AIR PHOTOGRAPHY AND FLIGHT PROGRAMMING.

(C) EXTENT OF PERMISSION TO UNCOVER OR OPEN CRATES OF EQUIPMENT IN TRANSIT.

(D) EXTENT OF PERMISSION FOR INSPECTORS TO APPROACH OR ENTER BARRACKS, WEAPON EMPLACEMENTS AND LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS.

(E) PERMISSION FOR INSPECTORS TO ENTER BARRACKS AND TO LOOK INSIDE E.G. TANK HANGERS.

(F) LIMITS DESIRED ON THE NUMBERS OF INSPECTORS AND THEIR  
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. REQUIREMENT OF ESCORTS AND ADVANCE  
NOTICE OF INSPECTIONS.

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(G) EXTENT OF PERMISSION FOR ACCESS OF INSPECTORS TO ROUTINE  
DOCUMENTS.

(H) DEGREE AND TIMING OF DETAIL FOR ADVERSARY INSPECTORATE:  
EXTENT OF PERMISSION FOR INSPECTION OF MOVEMENT OF  
FORCES (ON EXERCISE, MANOEUVRES AND NORMAL ROULEMENT).

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(1) AC/276-D(72)1  
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(J) EXTENT OF MODIFICATION OF A -H IF INSPECTION WERE  
MADE BY INTERNATIONAL OR NEUTRAL BODIES.

13. A PERUSAL OF THE LIMITATIONS PLACED BY ALLIED NATIONS  
ON ACCESSABILITY SHOW A GREATER READINESS TO ACCEPT A WIDE  
DEGREE OF INSPECTION THAN IS LIKELY TO BE THE CASE FOR THE  
WARSAW PACT.

SUMMARY OF PRESENT MILITARY/TECHNICAL VIEWS ON VERIFICATION

14. A SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT PRINCIPLES OF VERIFICATION AS  
HAVE DEVELOPED DURING THE STUDIES OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP ARE:

(A) NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION MUST CONTINUE UNABATED.

(B) OVERT VERIFICATION WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION  
TO UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. SOME MEMBERS WOULD PLACE OVERT  
INSPECTION AS A PRE-REQUISITE FOR UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

(C) ALLIED STIPULATIONS ON ACCESSIBILITY ARE LIKELY TO  
BE LOWER THAN THOSE REQUIRED BY THE WARSAW PACT.

(D) NATO HAS MORE TO GAIN THAN HAS THE WARSAW PACT FROM AN  
EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION SYSTEM.

(E) OF THE MEANS AVAILABLE FOR OVERT VERIFICATION, MOBILE  
TEAMS WOULD BE THE MOST EFFICIENT BOTH IN RESULTS AND  
MANPOWER COST.

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(F) STATIC POSTS WOULD BE A USEFUL ADDITION TO MOBILE TEAMS.

(G) STATIC POSTS WOULD BE AT THEIR MOST EFFECTIVE IF

MILITARY ROUTES INTO AND OUT OF THE NGA COULD BE  
LIMITED BY TREATY AND CIRCUMVENTION BY OTHER ROUTES  
COULD BE CHECKED BY OTHER VERIFICATION MEANS.

(H) AERIAL INSPECTION WOULD BE USEFUL ADJUNCT TO A  
GROUND SYSTEM OF INSPECTION.

(J) ANY OVERT SYSTEM WOULD BE A SUPPLEMENT TO NATIONAL MEANS.

(K) ANY NETOTIATED OVERT SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION WOULD BE  
PREFERABLE TO RELIANCE ON EXISTING NATIONAL MEANS ALONE.

(L) THE FINAL FORM OF AN OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTEM WOULD  
DEPEND UPON HOW AGREED REDUCTIONS WERE TO BE CARRIED OUT.

END TEXT OF STAFF GROUP DRAFT.  
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